THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HYBRIDIZATION PROCESS OF GOVERNANCE WITH EVOLUTIONARY GAME, MULTIPLE OPTIMA, AND PATH DEPENDENCE

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Hideki Takei

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i2p3

Abstract

While a hybrid governance mode has been considered as a transition mode, this consideration has been inappropriate in the current observations of hybrid modes that would be potentially a long-term stable mode. In addition, theoretical explanations of the traditional hybrid mode have lost explanatory powers since convergence ideas and assumptions have been rejected in the international corporate governance. This paper is a first challenge for theoretical explanations of the current emergences of new hybrid modes and hybridizations. While there are four phases of the hybridization, each phase would be discussed based upon evolutionary game theory, concept of multiple optima, and theory of path dependence that consider current drastic changes in international governance caused by mainly market globalizations, IT revolutions, and globalizations of shareholders.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Hybrid Model, Concept of Multiple Optima

How to cite this paper: Takei, H. (2004). Theoretical explanations of hybridization process of governance with evolutionary game, multiple optima, and path dependence. Corporate Ownership & Control, 2(2), 28-39. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i2p3