THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN TAIWANESE CORPORATIONS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR THE HETEROGENEITY OF INDUSTRIES AND FIRM SIZE

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Lie-Huey Wang ORCID logo, Hsien-Chang Kuo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c1p3

Abstract

Since the MM theory, scholars have discussed capital structure issues from the perspectives of agency problems in corporate governance. Corporate governance has been seen as the means to reducing the agency costs produced by aligning the interests of management and shareholders, and the incentive for the management to engage in opportunistic behavior has been influenced by the firm’s ownership and board of director structures. Previous studies, however, focus on traditional financial factors and neglect the debt and equity agency problems triggered by corporate governance and their possible influences on capital structure decisions. The sample used in this study consists of 317 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2007. By controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size, our models incorporate the cash flow rights-voting rights-seat control divergence, the ownership structure, and the structure of the board of directors to examine the effects of corporate governance on the firm’s capital structure. The results show that, when the divergence between cash flow rights and seat control is lower or when the divergence between voting rights and seat control is higher, the controlling shareholders can either control the board of directors to better monitor the firm or exhibit a preference for debt financing based on entrenchment motives. Further analysis indicates that blockholders prefer lower debt financing and do not expropriate minority shareholders. Financial institutional shareholders function through their provision of monitoring and the certification of debt for technological firms and can decrease the firms’ debts. The management in the technological industry firms prefers debt financing in order to obtain agency-related benefits. While directors in traditional industries or large firms might use personal or firm debt to tunnel the firm’s assets, the function of independent directors in technological firms or large firms of lowering debts in order to reduce the firm’s bankruptcy risks is more evident.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, the Structure of Board of Directors, Cash Flow Rights-Voting Rights-Seat Control Divergence

How to cite this paper: Lie – Huey Wang, L. H., & Kuo, H. C. (2008). The effects of corporate governance on capital structure in Taiwanese corporations after controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size. [Conference issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1-1), 35-47. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c1p3