STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE OF THE ALLIANCE SPECTRUM

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Lewis D. Johnson, Edwin H. Neave ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3c1p7

Abstract

This paper applies the principles of transaction cost economics to the strategic management of firms’ external alliances. External alliances span a spectrum from simple transactional relationships to outright control. Each of these alliance types requires a different degree of monetary and managerial investment. The paper shows that the optimal form of alliance aligns the governance capabilities of firm management with the attributes of the alliance relationship. We regard its approach as particularly relevant for cross-border alliances, especially when the legal and regulatory systems differ between the two countries.

Keywords: Governance, Transactions Economics, Alliances, Alignment

How to cite this paper: Johnson, L. D., & Neave, E. H. (2006). Strategic governance of the alliance spectrum. Corporate Ownership & Control, 3(3-1), 213-218. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3c1p7