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IS FAMILY BUSINESS BEAUTIFUL? EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN STOCK MARKET
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Daniela Venanzi 
, Ottorino Morresi
Abstract
From the agency perspective, literature studying links between investor protection and governance profiles argues that family is more disposed than other shareholders to divert private benefits in countries with a poor legal framework: the question is empirically puzzling. From the stewardship perspective, the degree of familiness affects the stewardship attitude of the firm. We do not find that family firms perform worse or better than non-family counterparts. Some evidence is found as regards the entrenchment effect: family CEOs seem to weaken firm performance. Stewardship attitude – not familiness – does matter: moderate levels of stewardship improve performance and increase risk-taking.
Keywords: Family Business, Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, Performance, Italian Listed Firms
How to cite this paper: Venanzi, D., Morresi, O. (2010). Is family business beautiful? Evidence from Italian stock market. Corporate Ownership & Control, 7(3-1), 173-187. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3c1p2
