CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA

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Abstract

Corporate governance has become a popular topic in recent years. Although much attention has been given to corporate governance in the United States and other Western countries as a result of recent scandals, and in Japan and other East Asian countries because of the financial crisis that occurred there a few years ago, much has also been going on in Russia and other transition economies in the area of corporate governance. This paper discusses recent developments in corporate governance in Russia and includes information gathered during interviews conducted in Russia during the summer of 2003.

Keywords: corporate governance, Russia, transparency, transition economy

Introduction

Corporate governance has become an important topic in Russia and other transition economies in recent years. Russian directors, owners and corporate managers have started to realize that there are benefits that can accrue from having a good corporate governance structure. Good corporate governance helps to increase share price and makes it easier to obtain capital. International investors are hesitant to lend money or buy shares in a corporation that does not subscribe to good corporate governance principles. Transparency, independent directors and a separate audit committee are especially important. Some international investors will not seriously consider investing in a company that does not have these things. Several organizations have popped up in recent years to help adopt and implement good corporate governance principles. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the U.S. Commerce and State Departments and numerous other organizations have been encouraging Russian firms to adopt and implement corporate codes of conduct and good corporate governance principles.

Review of the literature

Hundreds of articles and dozens of books have been written about corporate governance in the last few years alone. One book that should be mentioned is Corporate Governance, which is edited by Monks and Minow. This book is required reading for the ACCA Diploma in Corporate Governance program. Davis Global Advisors publishes an annual Leading Corporate Governance Indicators, which measures corporate governance compliance using a variety of indicators.

The Cadbury Report (1992) published the findings of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. The Greenbury Report (1995) discusses directors’ remuneration. The Hampel Committee Report (1998) addresses some of the same issues as the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. It has separate sections on the principles of corporate governance, the role of directors, directors’ remuneration, the role of shareholders, accountability and audit and issued conclusions and recommendations. The Encyclopedia of Corporate Governance is a good reference tool for obtaining information on corporate governance. It is available online. The OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) has been used as a benchmark for a number of corporate governance codes in transition economies. OECD has also published a Survey of Corporate

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Several Russian organizations also have websites and publications on corporate governance. The Russian Institute of Directors website contains news items and well as publications. Some of its publications and links include a *Code of Corporate Governance* (2002), several Foreign Best Practices Codes and several corporate codes of conduct. They also publish surveys and provide training for corporate directors in Russia. The Independent Directors Association also has a website that provides current information and various documents on corporate governance, mostly pertaining to directors. It also publishes a newsletter, which is available on its website. The Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance also has a website that contains publications about corporate governance in Russia. One of its studies is *Managing Corporate Governance Risks in Russia* (2002). It also provides corporate governance ratings of Russian firms.

**Methodology**

Research for this paper began with a review of the literature. When the review was completed, a list of tentative questions was formulated. Experts on corporate governance in Russia were then contacted and interviews were scheduled. Interviews with the following organizations were conducted in July and August 2003:

- Deloitte & Touche, Moscow office [www.deloitte.ru]
- KPMG, Moscow office [www.kpmg.ru]
- KPMG, St. Petersburg office [www.kpmg.ru]
- PricewaterhouseCoopers, Moscow office [www.pwcglobal.com/ru]
- Ajour, a Russian auditing and consulting firm, Moscow [www.ajour.ru]
- PKF (MKD), a Russian audit and consulting firm, St. Petersburg office [www.mkd-pkf.com]
- Independent Directors Association, Moscow [www.independentdirector.ru]

This paper incorporates the information gathered during those interviews. The information gathered from these interviews was combined with information that was already published and available. While much of the information gathered during the course of the interviews confirmed what the existing literature already said, much new information was gathered that filled in the gaps in the existing literature and extended and updated prior studies in several important ways.

Individuals interviewed consisted mostly of top-level and second-tier people at the various firms and organizations. In the case of accounting firms, one or more partners were interviewed. In some cases the top partner in the local office was interviewed. In other cases it was the partner in charge of corporate governance issues. Some accounting firms also...
grant employees with manager-level employees who worked with clients on corporate governance issues. In the case of the Independent Directors Association, we interviewed the director of that organization. It is difficult to provide a precise list of the questions asked at those interviews because the list of questions changed with each succeeding interview. The interviews were open-ended and usually began with a question like “What is going on in Russia in the area of corporate governance?” The advantage of this approach is that it allowed the interviewee to talk about the issues that he or she thought to be most important and pressing rather than to have us guide the direction of the interview into areas that might be of lesser importance. This technique enabled us to gather information that might have been missed if we confined ourselves to a strict list of questions.

After using this approach for several interviews at different firms we noticed that a pattern was beginning to emerge. Certain issues and approaches seemed to be dominant. In later interviews we focused more attention on these areas, partly to verify that the information gathered at prior interviews was based on widespread viewpoints and opinions rather than the viewpoint of just the person previously interviewed. What emerged from this approach was the belief that a certain consensus existed on the major issues. There was not much dispute about the areas of concern or the proposed solutions.

**Corporate governance activity in Russia**

Corporate governance is in its formative stages in Russia. Like other economies transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, Russia is going through rapid changes. Transparency in financial reporting is a relatively new concept. The Russian culture and mentality feel more comfortable with secrecy and prefer not to disclose anything they do not have to disclose.

A survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers of transparency in 35 countries ranked Russia number 34, just ahead of China [Haigh, 2001]. With such a lack of transparency it is little wonder why Russian firms find it so difficult to raise foreign capital. Russia is attempting to overcome this problem by instituting good corporate governance principles such as the appointment of independent directors, establishing audit committees and insisting on more financial disclosure. Change in the Russian attitude toward transparency and full disclosure is taking place mostly because of the need for foreign capital. Foreign investors hesitate to invest in a company that does not disclose all important financial information. Russian companies found they had to compete for capital in international financial markets and that was the impetus for change. Some major changes have already taken place, although there is still much work to do.

A few private sector organizations have been formed to assist Russian companies upgrade their corporate governance structure to meet international standards. The Russian Institute of Directors and the Independent Directors Association are both engaged in educating Russian directors and monitoring Russian corporations. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a World Bank funded organization, is devoting substantial resources into its Russia Corporate Governance Project. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is sponsoring conferences, publishing White Papers and conducting research to help Russian companies upgrade their corporate structures as well. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other organizations have also supported corporate governance initiatives. The International Finance Administration and the IFC developed a charter of basic principles.

Each of the Big-4 accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- are also actively engaged in educating corporate directors and top management about the need for good corporate governance. The education process is part of their regular client service. All four firms have newsletters or other kinds of educational documents that they distribute to their clients to educate them and keep them up to date on various accounting and corporate governance issues.

The Independent Directors Association (IDA) was formed in 1998, shortly after Russia’s financial default. Its stated mission is to establish a community of independent directors. Foreign and Russian investors who used intermediaries to buy shares found their property was disappearing. Brokers and dealers had to do something but they didn’t know what to do. One option was to sue, using the class action approach but this option did not exist in Russia. Also, lawsuits are not an efficient way of recovering property in Russia. The Independent Directors Association was developed as a vehicle to protect investors. It is a coordination center.

IDA pushed for the election of independent directors to represent minority shareholders. It advocated unanimous voting on corporate boards so that even one dissenting vote could prevent a measure from passing. The large Russian corporations balked at this provision, since they thought such a provision would result in having their corporation run by minority shareholders. Gasprom, a state owned monopoly, was especially vigorous in its opposition to this provision.

The IDA has also been pushing for Russian corporate boards to have subcommittees to perform various functions. Having subcommittees like a compensation committee or an audit committee is a new concept for many Russian companies but one they are not opposed to. The IDA has been pushing to have the audit committee composed exclusively of independent directors. There is some external pressure for Russian companies to have independent di-
rectors, especially on the audit committee. The New
York Stock Exchange has given nonresident compa-
nies two years to comply with NYSE rules as a con-
dition of having their stock listed on its exchange.
One of its requirements is to have independent direc-
tors on the audit committee. One important factor
investors look at when determining whether to invest
in a Russian company is whether the company has
independent directors. If it does not, the company is
much less attractive as a potential investment.

As a coordination vehicle, the IDA acts as a fa-
cilitator. It brings interested parties together and dis-
seminates information. At the time of the interview,
it had 30 investment banks and hedge funds as mem-
ers. As of September 2003 it opened up membership
to corporations as well. It also has contacts with
each of the Big-4 accounting firms as well as smaller
accounting firms and representatives of the various
Russian stock exchanges. It has also formed a rela-
tionship with the National Association of Corporate
Directors in the United States. The IDA also gives
awards each year for the company with the best fi-
nancial statements. The award looks at disclosure
and transparency, not the bottom line or financial
ratios.

The New York Stock Exchange and the London
exchange are the two main targets for Russian com-
panies in need of foreign capital. The IDA has estab-
lished a relationship with both of these exchanges as
well as Standard & Poors. Whether Russian compa-
nies issue financial statements, using U.S. Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS) depends on which
of the two exchanges they are targeting. Companies
that want to raise capital in the United States tend to
prepare GAAP statements, whereas those that want
to raise capital in London tend to issue IAS state-
ments.

In the last few years there has been a shift away
from GAAP statements toward IAS statements. The
reason given in the interviews was that in a post-
Enron world, U.S. accounting standards are seen as
being of lower quality or less reliability than Interna-
tional Accounting Standards. Since the Russian Fi-
nance Ministry has ordered Russian companies to
adopt IAS effective January 1, 2004 (one year before
the EU), this trend away from GAAP statements is
likely to continue. However, GAAP statements may
not disappear altogether from Russian company fi-
nancial reports. Russian companies that are affiliates
of a U.S. company is still likely to prepare financial
statements based on U.S. GAAP, since it is more
likely to try to raise capital at one of the New York
stock exchanges than the London exchange.

Standard & Poors initiated a pilot project out of
its London office to measure the extent to which
Russian companies complied with certain corporate
governance attributes. It chose five Russian compa-
nies and scored them based on a variety of factors.
The four key components the S&P study scored were:
ownership structure; relations with shareholder-
ers and shareholder rights provisions; financial
transparency and information disclosure; and the
structure of the board of directors. [Feinberg 2000]

It used the following 16 corporate governance
criteria to arrive at the scores for each company:
1. Ownership structure and influence;
2. Transparency of ownership;
3. Concentration and influence of ownership;
4. Financial stakeholder relations;
5. Regularity of, ease of, access to, and infor-
mation on shareholder meetings;
6. Voting and shareholder meeting procedures;
7. Ownership rights (registration and transfer-
ability, equality of ownership rights);
8. Financial transparency and information dis-
closure;
9. Type of public disclosure standards adopted;
10. Timing of, and access to, public disclosure;
11. Independence and standing of auditor;
12. Board and management structure and proc-
ess;
13. Board structure and composition;
14. Role and effectiveness of board;
15. Role and independence of outside directors; and
16. Board and executive compensation, evalua-
tion and succession policies. [Anon, 2000/2001]

The Standard and Poor’s study came about
partly because of the McKinsey & Co. Investor
Opinion Study of June 2000, which concluded that:
“Three quarters of investors say board practices are
at least as important to them as financial per-
formance when they are evaluating companies
for investment, especially in emerging markets
…. Over 80% of investors say they would be
prepared to pay more for the shares of well-
governed companies than those of poorly gov-
erned companies.” [Anon, 2000/2001]

The methodology it used could also be applied
to companies in other countries, making it possible
to compare a Russian company to a company in a
developed market economy. The pilot project proved
to be so successful that S&P plans to expand it to
rate companies worldwide based on their adherence
to corporate governance principles.

Weaknesses in corporate governance

Russia has a well earned reputation for poor corpo-
rate governance. As of 2001, the largest Russian
companies still hid their assets and cash flow from
minority shareholders. Gazprom, Russia’s largest
company, ignores the legal requirement of an inde-
pendent audit. Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil company,
routinely issues its financial statements months be-
yond promised deadlines, and when it finally did
issue some financial statements, they were unaudited
statements covering just a six-month period rather
than the full year statements that investors were ex-
perience [Anon, 2001a].

Various private groups have issued codes of
corporate governance that set out principles to be
followed by boards and corporate officers. These
codes provide guidance and attempt to raise the ethi-
cal quality of Russian executives to that of Western
company executives. The Russian Duma has passed
laws tightening up corporate governance require-
ments. But laws and voluntary (or even mandatory)
codes of corporate conduct are not enough. Merely
making rules and laws will not necessarily result in
good actions by board members. Rules are useless
without ethics.

One of the positive aspects of the Code of Cor-
porate Conduct that was prepared under the direction
of the Federal Commission for the Securities Market
(FCSM) is that ethics are stressed. The Code is im-
bu ed with ethics [Metzger et al. 2002]. Merely pass-
ing laws is not enough, either. A study by Pistor,
Raiser and Gelfer [2000] concluded that the effect-
iveness of legal institutions is much more important
than having good laws on the books. Transplanting
Western laws into transition economies and having
extensive legal reforms are not sufficient to
strengthen corporate governance, although such
things are necessary.

Survey results

The Russian Institute of Directors has conducted
surveys on various aspects of corporate governance.
One of the more important surveys is Disclosure of
Information about Corporate Governance Practices
and Compliance with the Code of Corporate Con-
duct Recommendations by the Russian Joint-Stock
Companies (2003), which surveyed 65 companies to
see what corporate governance practices they were
using and how well they were complying with the
Code of Corporate Conduct recommendations. Some
of their preliminary conclusions and comments are
summarized below. A comparative analysis of per-
formance from 2001 to mid-2003 revealed a positive
trend in Russian company corporate disclosures.
They seemed to be implementing the recommenda-
tions outlined in the Code of Corporate Conduct.
Positive changes in corporate governance practice
included the following:

- Practices of conducting general shareholder
  meetings, such as regularity, place, making
  of agendas, notification of shareholders, voting
  procedures and vote count;
- Structure of the corporate board, including
  the mix of executive and non-executive di-
  rectors and the separation of duties and po-
  sition between the chairman of the board
  and the executive body;
- More independent directors and representa-
  tives of minority shareholders on the board;
- Disclosure of key industrial indicators and
disaggregated financial statements; and
- An increased range of board functions re-
garding strategy, oversight, implementation
  and approval of major transactions and re-
 organizations.

The main impetus behind the changes is the
need to attract foreign capital investment. The
changes have had some results. The survey found a
positive correlation between corporate governance
practices and stock price.

Although corporate governance practices among
Russian companies have been improving, progress
has been slow. Disclosure and compliance levels
remain low by Western standards.

There is a wide gap between the few companies
at the top that have better than average practices and
the many companies far below them that continue to
have poor practices. The number of companies in the
survey that had average practices was few, indicating
a bimodal distribution. The survey listed the follow-
ing areas as the most problematic areas of corporate
governance:

- Lack of a clear information policy and an
  internal document that would clearly define
  its principles and classify different kinds of
  information circulating in the company;
- Poor disclosure of candidates for the board
  of directors during their nomination;
- Poor disclosure of information about mem-
  bers of the board of directors and senior
  managers;
- Poor performance of the board’s oversight
  functions, such as forming committees
  headed by non-executive directors and
  adoption of internal documents that define
  the functions and authorities of committees;
- Insufficient provision of clear and transpar-
  ent professional standards and ethical norms
  in the work of board members;
- Slow progress in building the internal con-
  trol systems and ensuring the board’s im-
  portant role in its work;
- Lack of criteria, procedures and regular
  evaluation of board performance, its mem-
  bers and senior management;
- Lack of criteria and procedures for deter-
  mining remuneration of board members and
  senior managers and disclosure of remu-
  neration;
- Weak procedures to help identify and settle
  conflicts of interest;
- Imperfect procedures of preparation and
  implementation of transactions with inter-
  est;
- Low effectiveness of audit work;
- Low level of disclosure of the main benefi-
  cial owners of the company’s stock; and
- Lack of a clear-cut dividend policy or its
  formalization.

The survey also compared Russian company
compliance with and adoption of the disclosure prin-
ciples outlined in the Code of Corporate Conduct with foreign corporate compliance with the recommendation made by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The survey found that the Russian companies with the highest scores for disclosure disclose information about a broader range of categories than the UNCTAD recommendations, but that disclosure is not as detailed. The survey also found that neither the Russian companies nor the foreign companies examined followed some of the corporate governance practices recommended by the various codes of conduct. One suggestion that was made as a result of this discovery was to take a poll of investors to determine what level of information disclosure would be appropriate in order for them to make practical decisions.

A survey of Russian company annual reports and websites found a wide divergence in terms of both content and format. There was no uniform format and a great deal of diversity in terms of content and volume of information. The quantity of information disclosed in English was often considerably more than the quantity of information disclosed in Russian, which makes sense if the goal is to attract foreign capital, since foreign investors are more likely to read English than Russian. However, the survey authors thought that this tilt toward more disclosure in English provided evidence of discrimination against Russian investors.

Another weakness in the Russian corporate governance structure is that few companies listed on Russian exchanges send their annual reports to the exchanges, and if they do, it is often after considerable delay. Russian stock exchanges can act to regulate and enhance the quality of corporate governance, but their role is reduced if they do not receive corporate financial information on a timely basis and if there is no penalty inflicted upon the Russian companies for failure to submit such information in a timely manner. One reason for the failure of so many Russian companies to provide financial information to the Russian stock exchange is because they see little value in providing the information. Russian companies are more focused on attracting foreign capital, and since little capital is to be had from the local Russian capital market, Russian managers see little reason to spend much time or effort submitting much information to it. As a result of this survey, the Russian Institute of Directors recommended that the Federal Commission on the Securities Market (FCSM) take the following measures: ensure that all joint stock companies observe content requirements for their annual reports as set forth by the Code and consider having mandatory disclosure requirements for open public company annual reports; make obligatory the disclosure of more corporate governance practices and the consistency or inconsistency with the recommendations of the Code of Corporate Conduct for certain companies; focus reviews of the companies’ corporate governance practices and their consistency with the information presented in reports to the FCSM; and optimize the methodology of information disclosure by various categories of companies and relate it to the overall revision of the companies’ disclosure policies.

The Russian Institute of Directors also suggested that a prerequisite for meeting these goals would be to strengthen penalties for disclosure related violations. RID suggests increasing both civil penalties, including fines, as well as criminal penalties, where appropriate.

Below are some of the RID survey findings.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform shareholders about general shareholder meetings at least 30 days in advance, unless a longer notice is prescribed by legislation.</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make sure that shareholders can study the list of persons authorized to take part in the general meeting, from the day when the general meeting is announced until the closure of general meeting, and in the case of an in absentia meeting until the last date of accepting the voting bulletins.</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>7.94%</td>
<td>7.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholders can put an item on the general meeting agenda or call for a general meeting without producing any documents if his rights for shares are accounted in a register, and if his rights for shares are accounted in a depo account, a statement from the depo account should be sufficient for exercising these rights.</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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</table>
From Table 1 it can be seen that substantial progress has been made in some areas of corporate governance relating to general shareholder meetings while no progress has been made in other areas. The most notable positive development in this area has to do with notifying shareholders of upcoming shareholder meetings. In a single year disclosure jumped from less than 10 percent to more than 40 percent. Absolutely no progress was made in the area of allowing shareholders to place items on the agenda or calling a general meeting.

Table 2 shows the level of compliance with various Code of Corporate Conduct Provisions relating to the board of directors. The highest level of disclosure, and one of the highest percentages of code consistency, was the provision requiring the company’s internal documents to require the board to approve large transactions. More than 87 percent of the companies in the survey made disclosures for this provision. Disclosures in the other categories were weak by comparison. The next highest disclosure percentage was 31.75%, which was for the provision requiring the board of directors to meet within a certain time period. Disclosures and code consistencies were even lower for the other provisions, which clearly show how far Russian corporate governance standards have to go before becoming comparable to Western standards.

**Table 2. Board of directors**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The board of directors of a joint stock company to have at least three (3) independent directors who meet the Code of Corporate Conduct requirements.</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td>19.05%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A joint stock company’s charter to include a requirement that the board of directors be elected only by cumulative voting.</td>
<td>25.40%</td>
<td>25.40%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The board of directors to meet at least once in six weeks during the year for which the company’s annual report is made.</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
<td>12.70%</td>
<td>31.75%</td>
<td>26.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The joint stock company’s internal document should require the board to approve transactions worth 10 % or more of its assets, except for transactions made in the course of its regular business.</td>
<td>77.78%</td>
<td>15.87%</td>
<td>87.30%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The board of directors to have an audit committee to draft recommendations for the board on choosing an audit firm and cooperate with it.</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>15.87%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audit committee to consist only of independent directors and, wherever this is not possible, only of independent and non-executive directors.</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audit committee to be chaired only by an independent director</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish a special board committee (personnel and remuneration committee) with a function to set the criteria for selecting prospective board members and establishing the company’s remuneration of the board members, CEO, management board members, managing organization (manager) and the company’s other payments to these persons (including life and health insurance, non-government pensions) and their performance evaluation criteria.</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>7.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The personnel and remuneration committee to consist only of independent directors and, wherever this is not possible, only of non-executive and independent directors.</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 continued

| The personnel and remuneration committee to be chaired only by an independent director | 0.00% | 0.00% | 3.17% | 3.17% |
| The company to have internal documents, approved by the board of directors, describing the procedures of forming the board committees and their work. | 3.17% | 3.17% | 6.35% | 6.35% |
| The company to have the procedures for defining the quorum of the board which will ensure compulsory participation of independent directors in the board’s work. | 1.59% | 1.59% | 3.17% | 3.17% |

Table 3. Charter and other internal documents

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Corporate Governance Disclosures by Russian Companies and Consistency of CG Practices with Recommendations of the Code of Corporate Conduct</td>
<td>Disclosed</td>
<td>Code-consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The company’s charter or other internal documents to include provisions that would regulate:</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- preparation, convocation and holding of a general shareholder meeting;</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- membership and work of the board of directors;</td>
<td>90.48%</td>
<td>90.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- membership and work of executive bodies;</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- election (appointment) and functions of the company’s corporate secretary;</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- material corporate actions;</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- information policy;</td>
<td>36.51%</td>
<td>36.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- procedure of oversight of the company’s financial and business operations;</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dividend policy;</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- procedure of settling corporate conflicts</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows the level of disclosure and compliance with some Code provisions relating to the corporate charter and other internal corporate documents. As can be seen, the level of disclosure and compliance is quite high in some areas and quite low or nonexistent in others.

If any brief summary could be made of the survey findings, it would be that the level of corporate governance practices is quite low – the average Russian company discloses only 7 of the 35 Code recommendations – but that corporate governance practices are getting better over time.

Protecting shareholders

Shareholders in every country are in need of protection, but especially so in Russia and other transition economies that have not yet established a strong rule of law and corporate legal principles that protect shareholders, especially minority shareholders.

Until a few years ago, minority shareholders were not only totally ignored but actually abused by the Russian companies they owned shares in. It was a common practice for Russian companies to manipulate shareholder registries or even erase their names from the corporate registry [Metzger et al. 2002] and tunnel money into an intricate web of shell companies, thus depriving minority shareholders of cash flow.

Management would sell off assets to entities they controlled indirectly, depriving minority shareholders of value [Iskyan, 2002]. Such practices became less severe after the Russian Duma enacted legislation to protect minority shareholders, but it would be premature to say that such practices have stopped altogether. The rule of law is still weak in Russia. It is difficult to protect property rights in a country where property rights did not exist for three generations.
The independent director code

As was previously mentioned, a number of corporate governance codes have been developed in the last few years, both by international organizations and by Russian organizations. The Independent Director Code is one of them. This code was developed by the Independent Directors Association jointly with the Russian Institute of Directors in partnership with Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange, the International Finance Corporation and the Good Governance Program of the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Its Code covers many of the same topics included in the Corporate Governance Code issued by the Russian Institute of Directors, which is discussed below.

The Code has more or less the same objectives as the Independent Directors Association, which has the stated goal of helping Russian joint stock companies improve their performance by implementing the best practices of independent directors’ work. The IDA provides training to independent directors, promotes the role and importance of independent directors among company CEOs, state bodies and within society and supports effective relationships between independent directors and companies. Its Code is one of the tools it uses to accomplish these tasks.

The Code is welcomed by Russian corporations, in the sense that it provides guidance and a path to follow, which will make it easier to raise capital in international markets. Applying the concepts outlined in the Code will also serve to make Russian corporations more efficient. However, not all Russian corporate executives and directors support the Code wholeheartedly because implementing the Code will force changes to the status quo and will reduce the power and arbitrariness of the present corporate governance structure. Inside directors will have to yield some power to independent directors who, by their very nature, cannot be controlled to the same extent as inside directors. It is probably fair to say that the Code is being accepted grudgingly in some quarters, although the advance of such codes is seen as inevitable.

Russian code of corporate conduct

The Russian Institute of Directors [RID] issued the final version of its Corporate Governance Code in April 2002. Although Russian law deals with many aspects of corporate governance, the laws that are on the books were considered to be inadequate to deal with certain issues that are not of a legal nature. Furthermore, it was recognized that the law should not try to address all issues relating to corporate governance, since some things legitimately lie outside of the law, such as private contract and management issues.

Also, the legal system is not designed to respond to rapidly changing conditions. Thus, the need was felt for a corporate governance code to provide the needed guidance.

The Code contains a list of recommendations for best practices and incorporates many of the recommendations included in various OECD publications. Chapter 1 states that corporate governance should be based on respect for the rights and lawful interests of all participants and mentions trust as a primary ingredient of good corporate management. In the past, shareholders at some Russian companies have found it difficult or impossible to exercise their rights. The Code states that shareholders should be provided with the means of registering their shares and they should also be given the opportunity to quickly dispose of them. Shareholders should be notified of shareholder meetings and should be able to attend. They should be able to easily vote their shares. Sec. 1.4 states that shareholders should have the right to receive regular and timely information about the company. This can be accomplished by: providing shareholders with comprehensive information on each item of the agenda in preparation for a general shareholders meeting; providing information that is sufficient for evaluating the results of operations, such as an annual report; and establishing the position of corporate secretary, whose job it will be to ensure that shareholders have access to information about the company.

Such provisions may seem bland and obvious to readers from developed market economies, but the reason why such provisions were included in the very first chapter of the Code was because of the widespread abuse of shareholders in regard to exercising shareholder rights and having access to corporate information.

Chapter 2 addresses the rules and procedures that should exist regarding the general shareholders meeting. Procedures for holding a shareholders meeting must be put in place and shareholders must be treated fairly and given the opportunity to participate in such meetings. At least 30 days notice should be given before every meeting, even though the law requires that only 20 days notice be given. The notice should contain sufficient information to allow shareholders to make informed decisions regarding the issues and to decide whether, and to what extent they shall participate. Agenda items should be stated clearly so that there is no misinterpretation as to their meaning. Meetings should be held at times and places that are convenient for shareholders. There are rules about quorums and what to do if a company has a large number of small shareholders.

Chapter 3 addresses issues relating to the duties of the board of directors. The Board is supposed to provide efficient supervision of the company’s financial and business operations, safeguard and protect the rights of shareholders and help resolve corporate conflicts.

There are three categories of director – executive, non-executive and independent. An independent director is one who: has not been an officer or em-
ployee of the corporation for at least three years; is not an officer of another company in which any company officer is a member of the appointments and remuneration committee of the board; is not affiliated with the company’s managing organization; is not bound by certain contractual obligations with the company; is not a major business partner of the company; and is not a representative of the government.

There are also provisions prohibiting the gainful use of insider information, provisions discussing the duties of the audit committee and the ethics committee and the liability of board members.

Chapter 4 discusses executive bodies of the company, which are charged with managing the company’s current affairs, making them responsible for attaining the company’s objectives and goals and implementing the company’s strategies and policies.

Chapter 5 outlines the duties and responsibilities of the corporate secretary. The secretary is responsible for preparing and holding the shareholders’ meeting as well as for a wide range of other activities involving shareholders.

Chapter 6 is about major corporate actions that result in fundamental corporate changes, such as a change in the rights of shareholders, reorganizations, acquisitions and liquidation.

Chapter 7 addresses issues relating to disclosure about the company. The enterprise’s policy should guarantee low cost and unhampered access to information. A great deal is said about the forms that disclosure should take. There are discussions about the information that should be included in the annual and quarterly reports and about the necessity to disclose all relevant information to shareholders in a timely manner. The annual report should include: the company’s position in the industry; attainment of the firm’s strategic objectives; annual results, both actual and planned; prospects for the company’s development, which includes discussions of sales, productivity, market share, income generation, profitability and the debt/equity ratio; major risk factors; relations with competitors; and review of the company’s most significant transactions during the prior year.

Chapter 8 discusses supervision of company’s financial and business operations. There are sections on the organization of activity of the audit committee, the actual audit and the need for an independent, certified audit.

Chapter 9 discusses dividends and dividend policy and suggests that the company implement a transparent and easily understood mechanism for determining the amount of dividends to be paid and the payment strategy.

Chapter 10 discusses the resolution of corporate conflicts. The interviews revealed that corporate codes of conduct are becoming increasingly popular. One might think that adopting a corporate code of conduct would be a major positive step, which it well may be.

However, the interviews also revealed that many corporations either do not have a corporate code of conduct or, if they do have one, tend to ignore it. Adopting such codes is sometimes seen as a public relations gimmick, something to be brought out and displayed to the financial community, but not something that can be referred to and used to manage or guide the corporation. If this is true, it means that much must be done before substantive change can be achieved.

Concluding comments

Russian financial statements still suffer from a lack of transparency. It is difficult to overcome generations of Russian culture and the Russian mentality, which prefers secrecy to disclosure. But the trend is toward more transparency, more independent directors and financial statements that have a degree of international credibility.

Poor corporate governance policies cause the shares of Russian firms to sell for $54 billion less than they would if their companies had good corporate governance policies, according to James Fenkner of Troika Dialog, Russia’s largest brokerage firm [Anon, 2001a]. Bernard Black, using data from Troika, conducted a study to determine whether corporate governance matters, in terms of share price. He found that it made a huge difference [Black, 2001]. Likewise, Russian companies that improved their corporate governance practices by adopting and implementing the Corporate Governance Code saw their share prices increase [Miller, 2002].

However, much still needs to be done. It is difficult to superimpose a corporate code of conduct on the Russian culture, especially if the code is drawn up by foreigners. Codes of conduct and the corporate governance policies they espouse will only take a firm hold in Russia when a significant number of Russian directors and managers actually believe that having and utilizing such codes is the right thing to do.

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