FAMILY BUSINESS, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AND BOARD EFFICACY: THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Download This Article

Tsun-Jui Hsieh, Yu-Ju Chen

DOI:10.22495/cocv11i1art7

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy. By using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed. The findings provide western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board independence. We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Outside Director, Family Business, Director Compensation

How to cite this paper: Hsieh, T. S., & Chen, Y. J. (2013). Family business, director compensation and board efficacy: the case of Taiwan. Corporate Ownership & Control, 11(1), 81-91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1art7