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EFFECTIVE BONUS?
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Gloria Y. Tian 
, Fan Yang
Abstract
Is it economically meaningful and ethical for firms to pay their CEOs cash bonuses in thousands, if not millions, of dollars? This paper empirically addresses two aspects of this issue. First, we document that a bonus is only statistically, but not economically, sensitive to short‐term firm performance and shareholder value creation. In addition, a discretionary bonus, on average representing 12% of a CEO’s annual compensation, adds little value to shareholders. Second, we find that firms with increased CEO bonuses have a higher likelihood of engaging in takeover activities, although such takeovers do not necessarily result in greater firm risk.
Keywords: Cash Bonus, Agency Problem, Business Ethics, Pay‐for‐performance, Takeovers
How to cite this paper: Tian, G. Y., & Yang, F. (2011). Effective bonus? Corporate Ownership & Control, 9(1-1), 211-220. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i1c1art5
