DO MARKET PARTICIPANTS PERCEIVE BLOCKHOLDERS’ POWER AND PREFERENCES? LOCUS OF CONTROL, PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY, AND FIRM VALUATION IN THE SWISS CONTEXT

Download This Article

Katarina Sikavica, Esther Kessler

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i4art3

Abstract

This study relies on preference heterogeneity and locus of control research to hypothesize about the impact of control types on firm valuation. We investigate whether market participants discriminate between control types when making investment decisions. Our empirical results of Swiss data suggest that control types represent discrete governance contexts with a unique set of conditions each related to a different level of principal-principal agency costs. Specifically, we find that firms with family ownership and professional management are valued more highly relative to other control configurations and that owners can use board and share structures to signal good governance. Our study thus provides support for a psychological and socio-political perspective of principal-principal conflicts of interests and expropriation of minority investors.

Keywords: Owner Types, Locus of Control, Preference Heterogeneity, Market Valuation, Principal- Principal Agency Costs

How to cite this paper: Sikavica, K., & Kessler, E. (2013). Do market participants perceive blockholders’ power and preferences? Locus of control, preference heterogeneity, and firm valuation in the Swiss context. Corporate Ownership & Control, 10(4), 31-46. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i4art3