CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSITION ECONOMIES

Download This Article

Abstract

This paper examines the corporate governance problem in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the major implications of highly concentrated ownership in these countries on their economic development. Our main message is that ownership and control in transition economies will remain highly concentrated in short-term aspect, and regulatory intervention should focus on protecting minority shareholder interests while maintaining the incentives for entrepreneurship and large shareholder monitoring. We also argue that the corporate governance system in transition economies will have to rely on active involvement and monitoring by large shareholders, even after the emergence of a class of professional managers. Moreover, our empirical results support Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) findings that controlling shareholders (strategic investors) are critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms; minority protection is also important to attract outside capital, but it may reduce the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Transition Economy, Ownership, Strategic Investors, Minority Shareholders, Regulations

How to cite this paper: Mateev, M. (2008). Corporate governance problem and its implications for transition economies. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(3-3), 335-348. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3c3p2