CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND

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Abstract

This paper examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. Using data collected from New Zealand listed companies for the financial year ending in 2005, the results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management. This suggests that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. On the other hand, the independence of the board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and chief executive officer, and the independence of audit committees are not significantly associated with earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management. The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand, particularly with regard to boards of directors, is mainly due to the lack of “experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations” (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8).

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Audit Committee, Board of Directors

How to cite this paper: Seng, D., & Findlay, J. (2013). Corporate governance and earnings management in New Zealand. Corporate Ownership & Control, 10(2), 40-55. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i2art4