Luca Enriques. S.J.D. (Bocconi University, Milan), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), J.D. (University of Bologna), is Professor of Business Law at the University of Bologna, Faculty of Law.

Before moving into academia, in 1999, Professor Enriques worked for Bank of Italy in Rome, first in the Banking Supervision Dept. and then in the Office for Law and Economics Research. A Research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (Brussels), he has published three books and several articles in Italian as well as international law reviews on topics relating to corporate law, corporate governance, and securities regulation. Among them: The Law on Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, in 2 Inter­na­tional and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 297-333 (2000); Corporate Governance in Italy After the 1998 Reform: What Role for Institutional Investors? (with Marcello Bianchi), in Quaderni di Finanza Consob n. 43, 2001; Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules (with Jonathan Macey), in 86 Cornell Law Review 1165-1204 (2001); Pyramidal Groups and Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy (with Marcello Bianchi and Magda Bianco), in Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate Eu­rope 154-86 (Oxford: OUP 2001); Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence From Milan, 3 European Business Organization Law Review 765-821 (2002); Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, in 38 Wake Forest Law Review 911-34 (2003); Off the Books, but on the Record: Some Evidence from Italy on the Relevance of Judges to the “Quality of Corporate Law” Debate, in Curtis Milhaupt (ed.) Global Markets, Domestic Institutions 257-294 (Columbia University Press: New York: 2003); Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 77-95 (2004); The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover Directive: Harmonization As Rent Seeking?, in Guido Ferrarini et al. (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 767-695 (Oxford: OUP 2004); EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 15 European Business Law Review 1259-74 (2004); The Mandatory Bid Rule in the EC Takeover Directive: Harmonization Without Foundation?, 1 European Company and Financial Law Review 440-57 (2004); The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law (Book review of Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford University Press 2004)), forthcoming in American Journal of Comparative Law.

He is a consultant to the law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen, and Hamilton
(Rome and Milan offices) since 2003.

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