REPUTATION OF LOW-QUALITY BIG 4 AND NON-BIG 4 AUDITORS: EVIDENCE FROM AUDITOR SWITCHES OF FORMER CHUOAOYAMA CLIENTS

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Hikaru Murase, Shingo Numata, Fumiko Takeda ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v2_i2_p1

Abstract

We examine how an auditor’s reputation for audit quality affects the selection of new auditors in a unique setting. Specifically, we investigate forced auditor switches after the collapse of ChuoAoyama and its successor, Misuzu, in a low litigation country, Japan, where the insurance value of auditing is minimal. We find that former ChuoAoyama clients with greater reputation concerns tended to switch away from Misuzu, a low-quality Big 4 audit firm. Our results also indicate that auditors’ sensitivity to reputation decreased after the collapse of Misuzu, perhaps because of intensified capacity constraints and decreased differences in perceived audit quality between Big 4 and Non-Big 4 auditors after the audit scandal and the introduction of the J-SOX.

Keywords: Auditor Switch, Agency Cost, Reputation Loss

How to cite this paper: Murase, H., Numata, S., & Takeda, F. (2013). Reputation of low-quality big 4 and non-big 4 auditors: Evidence from auditor switches of former ChuoAoyama clients [Conference issue]. Journal of Governance and Regulation, 2(2), 7-23. https://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v2_i2_p1