REMUNERATION, RISK AND PERFORMANCE IN ITALIAN COMPANIES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON SYSTEMS OF REMUNERATION IN THE BOARD OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES

Download This Article

Marco Artiaco

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i1c2art4

Abstract

The recent financial crisis highlighted the issue of Board of Directors compensation, which had been analyzed by many authors. In fact, there is a vast academic literature on the impact of the compensation of Board of Directors on corporations characterized by the separation of ownership from control. The compensation of Board of Directors has been a subject of debate, also by global regulators like OECD, FSB, Central Bank of Italy and European Commission and many are pushing for an international uniform regulation. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the board of Directors compensation, the company performance and the risks decided by the Board. The article analyses a sample of Italian listed companies in order to test wether or not the Board of Directors compensation structure could turn into a performance incentive, given the risk taken.

Keywords: Remuneration, Risk, Performance, Italy, Board of Directors

How to cite this paper: Artiaco, M. (2011). Remuneration, risk and performance in Italian companies: An empirical analysis on systems of remuneration in the board of Italian listed companies. Corporate Ownership & Control, 9(1-2), 294-304. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i1c2art4