RELATED-PARTY DISCLOSURES IN THE TWO-TIER BOARD SYSTEM IN CHINA: INFLUENCES OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD COMPOSITION

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Yuan George Shan, Dennis Taylor

https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv4i1art3

Abstract

This study concerns related-party disclosures by listed companies in China, in a corporate context of a high concentration of government-linked ownership, a two-tier board system, and the engagement of directors, key managers and major shareholders in direct and indirect transactions and business relationships with their company. Using content analysis of annual reports of listed companies in China over 5-years from 2001 to 2005, results show that the comprehensiveness of related-party disclosures is positively affected by companies’ domestic ownership concentration and the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board. But the proportion of supervisory board members with professional knowledge and experience is, unexpectedly, found to have a significant inverse relationship with the extent of related-party disclosure. Reasons peculiar to the context in China are proffered, particularly the likelihood of internal censorship of the more professionally qualified members of supervisory boards.

Keywords: Board governance; ownership structure; two-tier board, related-party disclosure; China

How to cite this paper: Shan, Y. G., & Taylor, D. W. (2008). Related-party disclosures in the two-tier board system in China: Influences of ownership structure and board composition. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 4(1), 37-49. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv4i1art3