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EFFICIENCY OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: WILLINGNESS-TO-COMPLY AND AGENCY PROBLEMS
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Michael Nwogugu 
Abstract
Using the events that occurred in a series of corporate transactions in the US (Nwogugu (2004)), this article analyzes the efficiency of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”; 2002, USA) and introduces new quantitative models of Willingness-To-Comply which is a statistical measure of the employee/company’s propensity to comply with SOX and similar regulations.
Keywords: Sarbanes Oxley Act, Deterrence Effect and Fraud, Willingness-To-Comply, Complexity, Disclosure, Due Diligence
How to cite this paper: Nwogugu, M. (2007). Efficiency of Sarbanes-Oxley act: willingness-to-comply and agency problems. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(1-3), 449-458. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c3p5
