AGENCY PROBLEMS IN THE PUBLIC CONTRACTING CONTEXT

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Maria Belén Lozano ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3p1

Abstract

This survey synthesizes the study of public contracts from an agency perspective, detecting possible inefficiencies in the contracting context between government and firms. In this sense, we offer a clear analysis framework in order to improve efficiency in contracting processes. To do this, we have divided this situation into two conflicts of interest. On the one hand, we have the conflict between citizens and the firm with which the services will be contracted (fundamentally when there is a divergence in the price determination) and, on the other hand, the difference in interests between citizens and public officials. This analysis from a managerial perspective allows us to delve more deeply into a topic scarcely treated in the literature: the relationship of firms to the public sector. It also allows us to reflect on the efficient (or inefficient) behavior which firms are subject to in the contracting process.

Keywords: Сonflicts of Interest, Public Contracts, Enterprise, Efficiency

How to cite this paper: Belén Lozano, M. (2008). Agency problems in the public contracting context. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(3), 9-14. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3p1