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A MODEL FOR SELECTING NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BANKS

Ronald H Mynhardt

DOI: 10.22495/cocv10i3siart4

Abstract

In the United States, an accusation was made that incompetent boards were ruining some of the once great American companies as the financial crisis of 2008 was a failure of corporate governance. The reason given was that the boards of these companies were private clubs and not representative democracies. Increasing levels of boardroom regulation and risk have also placed greater demands on the non-executive directors of companies meaning that selecting the candidates with the right knowledge, experience and skills is of the upmost importance. A study was conducted amongst South African banks and no consistent model of selecting non-executive directors was found. In this study a model is proposed to select the candidates with appropriate knowledge, experience and skills in the banking industry.

Keywords: Banks, Non-Executive Directors, Executive Directors, Companies, Regulation, Policies, Selection Criteria, Chartered Accountants, Succession Planning

How to cite this paper: Mynhardt, R. H. (2013). A model for selecting non-executive directors: The case of South African banks [Special conference issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 10(3), 51-60. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i3siart4

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